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Multiple Models.  
In the Mind and in the World 
Barbara Tversky ∗ 
Abstract: »Multiple Modelle. Im Geist und in der Welt«. Models, in whatever 
sense, have a dual status: they are what they are and they represent something 
else, even Borges’ (1999) legendary point-to-point map. Representations select, 
add, and distort the information they represent. Models are meant for more 
than representation; they are meant as thinking tools, to promote inference, 
discovery, and creative thought. Research has shown that representations cre-
ated on the page or in the air (gesture) have an accessible semantics and syntax 
and that such representations promote thought through a wordless conversa-
tion between the eye and the hand and the (sometimes virtual) page. 
Keywords: Model, representation, inference, diagram, sketch, gesture. 
1.   Introduction 
Model is one of those abundantly useful words that gets used abundantly by 
many communities in varying senses. Whether a model airplane or a model of 
good behavior or a business model or fashion model or a mathematical model 
or a mental model – what these seemingly disparate examples have in common 
is that they represent something else. Now, representation is one of those 
abundantly useful words that gets used abundantly in varying senses, so it’s not 
clear we’ve made progress. But let’s dig a little deeper, starting with the con-
cept of representation. A common view of representation is that it extracts 
certain features and relations from whatever it’s representing, but not all. It 
maps elements and relations in the represented world to elements and relations 
in the representing world. Whoever or whatever created the representation 
presumably selected those features and relations for a reason. A paradigmatic 
example of a representation is a map; it takes places and relations among them 
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in the real world to places and relations in the representing world, the map. 
Someone designing a map for cyclists would select different features and rela-
tions than someone designing a map for drivers. Representations do more than 
select. They can also add information, say names of towns and streets, geo-
graphical borders, icons for restaurants and hotels, bands of color for depths of 
oceans or altitudes of mountains, and they can distort information, say straight-
ening roads and enlarging them. Weather maps add notations for weather pat-
terns that are invisible.  
A model generally does more than represent. It is meant to go further, to en-
courage thought, to allow inferences, discovery and creative leaps. It’s a think-
ing tool.  
Models need not be tangible. Models can be mental, a set of beliefs of how 
something, a machine or a government or a person, operates. Of course physi-
cal phenomena, the firings of neurons, underlie mental models but mental 
models are not equivalent to the firings of neurons or even the specific firings 
of specific neurons. Models can be created by words, which have physicality in 
the form of sound waves or marks on a page, but again they are not equivalent 
to their physical instantiation. I can use words instead of a map or a diagram to 
tell you how to get from the train station to the hotel or how to operate the 
ticket machine for the train and you can use those words to create a mental 
model. If my words created from my mental model and your mental-modelling 
are precise enough you should be able to buy a ticket and arrive at the hotel. 
Even if, as is typical, much information is left out; representations and models 
are always used in a context of shared understanding. 
Even if the words are carefully crafted, turning a mental representation in 
one mind into the right set of words and translating the words into a mental 
model in another mind can be effortful and error-prone, especially when the 
spatial array or the set of actions are complicated. Words are wonderful, I use 
them frequently and rather like them, but they bear arbitrary relations to mean-
ing.  
There are other forms of communication, both for self and for other, that 
have more direct correspondences to meaning. I’m thinking, of course, of ges-
ture and graphics. By gesture I mean poses or actions of the body, especially of 
the hands and head, that act on thought rather than on the world. By graphics I 
refer to marks on a virtual page, with a broad scope for both. Marks could be 
the parts of a model of a building or a molecule and a page could be a screen or 
the face of a rock or a virtual 3-D space that stands for a building or a mole-
cule. Graphics also include sketches, photos, maps, charts, diagrams, and such. 
There are two important points here. The ways that information is represented 
in gesture and graphics is more natural, immediate and direct than the ways 
information is represented in words. Next, both gesture and graphics are in the 
world, not in the mind. They are outside the mind and not only can be sensed 
but must be sensed by the body. Of course we can imagine gesturing and imag-
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ine seeing or creating graphics but imagination is between the ears, and the 
stuff that’s beyond the ears and can be sensed has a different status and differ-
ent effects. And of course words can be outside the mind and sensed by the 
body but they fail the tests of naturalness and directness of representation.  
So far, a lot of words. Now for some action. Or truthfully, words that de-
scribe research activities that give backing to and expand the claims. Because 
we thought that representing and thinking with words is far from sufficient to 
understand how people represent and think about many of the important things 
in their lives, faces, bodies, objects, spaces, and events in time, we studied 
those one by one to uncover how they are represented and thought about 
(Tversky 2005a, 2005b; Tversky 2009; Tversky, Zacks and Hard 2008). The 
upshot: mostly not in words; each followed its own logic though descriptions of 
each in words turns out to be fascinating in and of itself. Then we turned to the 
spaces people create to expand their own thought. These have a long, long 
history. Cave paintings date back at least 35,000 years. Images of maps, ani-
mals, people, and mysterious symbols incised in stone are ancient and scattered 
across remote parts of the world. What roles these served for the people who 
made them or viewed them can only be a matter of speculation but the difficul-
ty of making them and their ubiquity attest to strong human–and only human–
desires to create and contemplate them. 
2. Graphics 
One line of research has been showing how graphics communicate (Tversky 
2009): what are the semantics and pragmatics of graphic displays and how do 
people use them for comprehension, inference, discovery and creativity? 
Graphics make use of marks on a page and place on a page to convey a range 
of meanings quite directly. Gesture turn out to be similar, but of course also 
different. Let’s start with graphics even though gesture comes first, phylogenet-
ically and ontogentically. Again maps serve as a paradigmatic example: maps 
map; they use elements and spatial relations on a page to represent elements 
and spatial relations in the world. Visual-spatial representations of people, 
animals, objects, and mechanical systems do the same. Many other sets of 
concepts that are not inherently spatial can be spatialized: mandalas, the Peri-
odic Table, organization charts, and graphs among them.  
2.1  Place on a Page 
Even preschool preliterate children can use place on page meaningfully. They 
can put stickers along a line on a page to represent the temporal relations of 
breakfast, lunch and dinner or the quantitative relations of handfuls, bag-fulls, 
and shelf-fulls of candy or their preferences for foods. They are inclined to put 
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greater quantities and values up rather than down. Older children readily use 
proximity on the page to represent proximity on an abstract dimension, time, 
quantity, preference. Why up? Most likely because going up means countering 
gravity, so going up takes strength and health, because people grow taller as 
they grow older, that taller people and buildings and trees are stronger, that 
more money makes a taller pile, that healthy energetic people stand tall and 
weak depressed ones are stooped – the vertical dimension is loaded. All (or 
almost all) good thing go up; it’s overdetermined. The horizontal dimension is 
more neutral though reading order confers substantial directional preferences 
and handedness confers value preferences.  
2.2  Marks on a Page 
There are several kinds. First there are words and word-like symbols and ab-
breviations. Next there are depictive elements, presumably the original founda-
tions of ideographic languages, depictions that resemble what they represent 
like a depiction of the sun or a crescent moon as well as depictions or icons that 
represent figuratively, like the scales of justice or a trash can for deleting files 
or a file folder for creating them. The elements we have been most interested in 
are a third kind, meaningful abstract forms: dots, lines, arrows, circles, boxes, 
and blobs. It’s a long story, so just a few examples here. In a series of experi-
ments in which people interpreted and created graphics, we found that these 
forms have context-sensitive meanings that have shared readily grasped mean-
ings. Dots can represent intersections in maps, people in social networks, ideas 
in knowledge networks. Lines connect dots. They serve as paths in maps and 
relationships in social networks and connections in knowledge networks. Boxes 
contain one set of things and separate those things from things in other sets. 
The Periodic Table elegantly puts each separate element in a box and arranges 
them in rows and columns that represent their molecular properties. 
2.3  Using Graphics 
We’ve not only looked at how graphics are designed to represent a range of 
information, we’ve also looked at the ways different forms of graphics serve 
learning, comprehension, inference, discovery and creativity. These interact 
interestingly with expertise, ability and task. Maps allow a plentitude of infer-
ences based on proximity and direction as well as terrain. So does the Periodic 
Table. The same information presented in different ways encourages different 
inferences, for example people interpret bar graphs as discrete comparisons and 
lines as trends. For learning and comprehension, clarity is critical. Creating 
either a visual or verbal explanation of STEM phenomena increases learning 
but creating a visual explanation is far more powerful (Bobek and Tversky 
2016). For design, art and data discovery, ambiguity is productive because it 
allows for reconfiguration and reinterpretation. Architects and artists say they 
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have conversations with their sketches, they draw for one reason but when they 
examine what they’ve drawn, they make unintended discoveries. From those 
they get new ideas (Tversky and Suwa 2009). The same processes of discovery 
hold for scientists trying to understand a large and complex data set.  
3. Gesture 
Like graphics, gestures also map and spatialize. They use actions in space and 
place in space to map meanings directly. Gesture has some advantages over 
graphics, and some disadvantages as well. Gesture needs nothing more than the 
body we were born with, no pencil, no paper. Gestures are dynamic, so perhaps 
better suited to represent dynamic information, change over time. But gestures 
are fleeting while graphics on a page stay still in front of the eyes to be con-
templated and revised. We have been studying the roles of gesturing and dif-
ferent kinds of gestures for both those who view gestures and those who per-
form them. Gestures commonly accompany speech and often add important 
information not conveyed by the words. The same explanation in words, say of 
arrangements of events in time or explanations of the workings of an engine, 
are understood differently depending on the gestures that accompany the 
speech. More surprising is the finding that the gestures people make alone in a 
room without speaking influence their own understanding and memory. In one 
study, students alone in a room studied descriptions of environments such as a 
small town or a large gym with four or eight landmarks and paths among them 
(Jamalian, Giardino and Tversky 2012). They knew they would be tested and 
that the tests would require inferences, such as spatial relations from perspec-
tives different from those in the descriptions. A majority of participants ges-
tured while reading at least one of the four descriptions. They produced line-
like gestures for paths and point-like gestures for landmarks. That is, as a set, 
their gestures formed models of the environments. Those who gestured per-
formed better on the tests than those who didn’t and those who gestured for 
some descriptions but not all performed better on the descriptions for which 
they gestured. Another group was required to sit on their hands; they performed 
worse. They rarely looked at their hands so the facilitation seems to be spatial-
motor. Gesturing clearly helped them think. We think the spatial-motor repre-
sentations created by the gestures translated the words into thought. 
4. In Sum 
Models are necessary for thinking; by omitting, adding, and distorting the 
information they represent they can recraft the information into a multitude of 
forms that the mind can work with to understand extant ideas and create new 
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ones. Models take elements and relations among them in the represented world 
and map them onto elements and relations in the representing world. In the 
cases of tangible, diagrammatic, and gestural models, the elements and rela-
tions are spatial. The fundamental elements are dots and lines, nodes and links. 
A dot can represent any concept from a place in a route to an idea in a web of 
concepts. Lines represent relations, any relation, between dots. As such, spatial 
models rely on more direct and accessible mappings than language, which 
bears only arbitrary relations to meaning. These mappings can be put into the 
world and made visible or visceral in graphics and gesture. Putting thought into 
the world promotes thought in self and other.  
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